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CABLE FRANCHISING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: CABLE OPERATORS'
ACCESS RIGHTS TO UTILITY POLES
UNDER THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
From sitcom reruns to educational programming, from Australian-
rules football to home shopping, the growth of cable television has di-
versified the resources available within the home.' While the technol-
ogy is readily available, the battle for exclusive franchise rights2 is
slowing cable expansion.3 Municipalities generally grant one cable op-
1. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history and
growth of cable television.
2. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
A 'Franchise is the term commonly used to describe the license issued by a local
governmental entity to a cable television operator to build and maintain a cable
system in the community. The original need to license cable systems arose because
cable operation, like any other public utility, requires easements across public and
private property in order to gain access to individual households. Thus, in the
interest of preserving the integrity of the public domain, a licensing or franchising
process developed whereby a city could demand assurances of responsible behavior
from a prospective cable operator.
Central Telecommunications Inc. v. TOI Cablevision Inc., 610 F. Supp. 891, 895 n.5
(D.C. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986).
3. See generally Lee, Cable Franchising and the First Amendment, 36 VAND. L.
REv. 867 (1983) (a blistering attack against municipalities for their disregard of cable
operators' first amendment rights). Municipalities force cable operators to battle
against each other for the right to obtain a cable franchise. The municipalities can
obtain services such as access channels from cable companies by conditioning permis-
sion to use public right of ways upon delivery of such services. Id. at 873. Municipali-
ties' demands in some cases are so great that they prohibit companies from obtaining
franchises. Id.
On the other hand, cable operators have sued municipalities in an effort to vindicate
their first amendment rights. The lack of a clear standard with which to judge cable
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erator access rights to the public property required to deliver cable to a
local market.4 This system fosters intense politicking,5 improper influ-
ence,6 and bribery.7
The first amendment safeguards a speaker's right to disseminate in-
formation.8 While the Supreme Court has recognized that cable opera-
tors engage in activities protected by the first amendment, 9 the Court
has been unwilling to articulate cable television's first amendment sta-
tus. 10 As a result, the Court has failed to resolve the permissible degree
of governmental regulation in granting cable franchises and has left the
first amendment rights of cable operators, municipalities, and consum-
operators' and consumers' first amendment rights has left the proper role of municipal
regulation in doubt. See generally Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United
States, 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034
(1986).
4. See supra note 2. See infra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the Cable
Franchising Act's requirement that cable operators obtain a franchise from a municipal-
ity before engaging in service). See M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE § 4.02 (rev. ed.
1985). A franchising authority awarding a cable franchise engages in four steps: (1) as-
sessing community needs, (2) requesting bids, (3) evaluating bids, and (4) selecting an
operator. Lee, supra note 3, at 871-72.
5. See New York Today Picks Its Cable-TV Winners for Four Boroughs, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 6 (description of cable operators lobbying and politicking
efforts to secure franchises); Millions Spent in Contest for 'Showcase'Denver Cable Con-
tract, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1982, at A12; Competition for Cable TV Rights Heating Up,
As St Louis Discovers, Wall St. J., March 2, 1981, at 19, cols. 4-6.
6. For a discussion of improper influence, see Central Telecommunications, 610 F.
Supp. at 895. In Central Telecommunications, cable operators seeking an exclusive
cable contract threatened to ruin the career of a city consultant, attempted to intimidate
city officials by threatening to flood the city's market with satellite dishes, and
threatened to terminate all cable television services unless the city renewed TCI's
franchise. Id
7. Id at 895-98 (operator threatened to withhold franchise fees unless franchise was
renewed). See United States v. Kahn, 340 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 472
F.2d 272 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
8. Lovell v. Griffen, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (liberty of the press is essential to the
nature of a free state).
9. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2037. Numerous circuit courts have
recognized cable television's first amendment rights. Quincy Cable TV v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, 768 F.2d 1434, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Tele-Communications
of Key West, 757 F.2d at 1336; Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1052-57
(8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689.
10. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2037. Writing for the Court, Justice
Rehnquist observed that cable television shares common characteristics with both
broadcast and print media. Id He refused, however, to resolve cable's first amendment
status without a more in-depth presentation of the facts. Id
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ers in limbo.11 Despite the lack of Supreme Court guidance, lower
courts have considered whether the first amendment allows the govern-
ment the same latitude in regulating the cable television industry as it
allows the broadcast media,12 or whether the degree of protection
should be closer to that enjoyed by the traditional media13 such as
11. In recent years, cable operators have extensively litigated the proper scope of a
municipality's authority to regulate cable operators' access to local markets. See, e.g.,
Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. 2034; Tele-Communications of Key West, 757
F.2d at 1335-39; Omega Satellite Product v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 125-29
(7th Cir. 1982); Community Communications Inc. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370,
1375-80 (10th Cir. 1981); Carlson v. Village of Union City, 601 F. Supp. 801, 809-12
(W.D. Mich. 1985); Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465
(W.D. Cal. 1986); Hopkinsville Cable TV Inc. v. Pennyroyal Cablevision Inc., 562 F.
Supp. 543, (W.D. Ky. 1982).
12. The Court has employed different standards for judging the constitutionality of
governmental regulations of the print and broadcast media. The Court has reasoned
that different standards are necessary because the broadcast media faces physical limita-
tions which the print media does not. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 386-400 (1986). The Red Lion Court upheld the FCC's fairness doctrine,
which required broadcasters to allow an individual who was personally attacked in a
broadcast to respond to the charges. The Red Lion Court found that the government
could limit the number of speakers to prevent all speech from being extinguished. Ii at
387. Similarly, Justice Frankfurter once wrote that if everyone talked over the air "no
one could be heard." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212
(1943). The limitation on access to the broadcast media furthers the first amendment
purpose of promoting free speech by ensuring that speakers can reach their audience.
The Court has found that such regulation was not necessary nor constitutional with
regard to the print media because no physical impediments exist which limit the
number of speakers who can use the medium. In Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 256-58 (1974), for example, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional Florida's
right to reply statute, which granted a political candidate equal space to reply to a
newspaper's criticism. Id The candidate argued that the an economically privileged
few controlled the press and that it is economically infeasible for most cities to support
more than one newspaper. Id at 249-50. Noting that the proper concern was not eco-
nomics, but the ability of a newspaper to decide for itself what to print, the Court held
the statute unconstitutional even if the newspaper encountered no added cost in running
the reply. Id. at 257-58.
See Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1438, 1439 for a description of the technological and
economic attributes of the broadcast, print, and cable media.
The Court's analysis in Miami Herald focuses on physical barriers to entry instead of
economic conditions. Under the print versus broadcast distinction, cable television
would clearly fall on the print side. Although it may not be economically feasible, there
are no physical limitations to the number of cable operators who can service a commu-
nity. See infra note 159.
13. The Court has traditionally been more willing to allow municipalities to regu-
late the broadcast media. For example, in FCC v. League of Women Voters of Califor-
nia, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the Supreme Court found a statute prohibiting editorializing
on public broadcast stations to be unconstitutional. The Court noted that although the
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newspapers. 14
In Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,15 the
Ninth Circuit became the first appellate court to limit, on first amend-
ment grounds, a municipality's ability to award an exclusive cable
franchise in a local market. 6 The court's reliance on the public forum
doctrine 7 is a creative and innovative approach which lends increased
broadcast media "operates under restraints" due to physical limitations that bar access
"not imposed on other media, the thrust of these restrictions has generally been to se-
cure the public's First Amendment interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views
on diverse matters of public concern." Id at 380.
The Court has refused to allow municipalities to restrict access of the print media to a
local market and has rejected the suggestion that purely economic constraints on the
number of viable entities in a community justify intrusions into first amendment rights.
Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258.
14. Several circuits have held that the "physical scarcity rationale" is irrelevant to
an evaluation of government regulation of cable television. Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at
1448-49 ("[T]he scarcity rationale has no place in evaluating ... cable television.");
Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 127 (noting that the problem of frequency interference
does not arise with cable television). The court in Quincy Cable observed that "unlike
ordinary broadcast television, which transmits the video image over airwaves which are
capable of bearing only a limited number of signals, cable reaches the home over a
coaxial cable with the technological capacity to carry 200 or more channels." 768 F.2d
at 1448.
Several circuits following this line of reasoning have held that where a natural mo-
nopoly exists with respect to a city's cable television market, the city may offer an exclu-
sive franchise. Central Telecommunications, 800 F.2d at 715-17; Omega Satellite, 694
F.2d at 127-28 (the "natural monopoly characteristics of cable television provide.., an
argument for regulation of entry"); Community Communications v. City of Boulder,
660 F.2d 1370, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
The Ninth Circuit refused to apply the scarcity rationale to cable in Preferred, 754
F.2d at 1403-04. The court did not decide whether a natural monopoly would justify
the award of an exclusive franchise. 754 F.2d at 1404-05. The court reasoned that
because cable has no physical limitations, it is analogous to print media and therefore is
entitled to a greater degree of first amendment protection. A California district court
adopted this view in Century Federal, 648 F. Supp. at 1471.
The Eighth Circuit interpreted the Preferred decision to mean that a natural monop-
oly would not justify exclusive franchising. Central Telecommunications, 800 F.2d at
716.
15. 754 F.2d 1396 (1985), aff'd in part and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
16. 754 F.2d at 1411. Prior to Preferred Communications, several courts considered
a city's interest in restricting cable operators' use of city property (i.e., utility poles and
public rights of way). See Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d 119; Community Communications,
660 F.2d 1370; Century Federal, 579 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Subsequent to the
Ninth Circuit decision in Preferred, one other court faced the question of the govern-
ment's power to deny cable television operators access to utility poles. See Central Tele-
communications, 610 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir.
1986).
17. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1408-09. See infra notes 171-178 and accompanying text.
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protection to the first amendment rights of cable operators and
consumers. 
1 8
The Supreme Court recently declined the opportunity to comment
on the Ninth Circuit's use of the public forum doctrine.19 The Pre-
ferred court's decision provides increased first amendment protection
for cable television, adds a divergent constitutional view to industry
governance, and emphasizes the growing need for the Supreme Court
to resolve cable television's first amendment status.2 0
This Note will analyze the Ninth Circuit's use of the public forum
doctrine in light of the doctrine's historical development and its appli-
cability to cable television. Part I focuses on the history of cable televi-
sion regulation. Part II summarizes the development of the public
forum doctrine. Part III discusses the Preferred Communications deci-
sion. Part IV analyzes Preferred's use of the public forum doctrine.
Finally, this Note concludes that while the Ninth Circuit's application
of the public forum doctrine was correct, the effectiveness of the argu-
ment is uncertain because the doctrine is generally difficult to apply,
particularly to the problems of cable television.
I. THE HISTORY OF CABLE TELEVISION REGULATION
Cable television originated in Pennsylvania during the late 1940's.2
Early cable systems extended broadcast television signals to rural areas
and small communities that were unable to receive quality reception
due to their distance from broadcasters or the interference of geo-
graphic barriers.22 A decade after the first system began operating, 550
18. See infra notes 203-204 and accompanying text.
19. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986) (the
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision on the antitrust claim, but remanded to the
district court for more fact finding on the first amendment issue).
20. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
21. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). For a more
complete discussion of the history of cable television, its development and regulation,
see Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1438-44; P. PARSONS, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 11-20, 29-44 (1987); M. HAMBURG, supra note 4, at §§ 1.02, 1-6;
Stanzler, Cable Television Monopoly and the First Amendment, 4 CARDOzO L. REV.
199, 205-10 (1983).
22. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 163. The Court noted that "CATV systems
perform either or both of the functions. First, they may supplement broadcasting by
facilitating satisfactory reception of local stations in adjacent areas in which such recep-
tion would not otherwise be possible; and second they may transmit to subscribers the
signals of distant stations entirely beyond the range of local antennae." Id. During the
1960's the Court did not consider cable television's first amendment implications be-
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cable systems were serving an audience of 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 view-
ers.23 The dramatic increase of the cable television industry accompa-
nied the growth of broadcast television during the same period.24 As
of 1981, cable systems served approximately 17.2 million subscribers,
the vast majority of whom lived in areas also served by broadcast
television.25
Rapid technological advances, particularly in the use of communica-
tion satellites to distribute programs nationally,2 6 greatly aided cable
television's success. Modem cable systems provide over 100 television
channels.2 7 The bulk of communications transmitted via cable consists
of video, entertainment, and news programming. In addition, cable
provides services unavailable to the broadcast television viewer.
Cable's physical link to the home allows the subscriber to transmit
communications back to the operator. The operator, therefore, can
provide such services as burglar and fire alarm monitoring and elec-
tronic mail delivery services.28
A. FCC Regulation
The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) objective in reg-
ulating cable has been twofold: to protect the broadcast industry from
cable and to "provide fair, efficient and equitable" distribution of infor-
mation to all citizens.29 To achieve these objectives, the FCC has in-
cause no competition existed between cable and broadcast television. P. PARSONS,
supra note 21, at 3. Cable operators were simply bringing programming to markets that
did not receive broadcast television. Id
23. Id. at 162. The Court found that the growth of cable television would be "ex-
plosive." Id. at 163.
24. Television Digest, 39 TELEVISION FAcTBOOK 72(a) (1970). The broadcast televi-
sion industry grew from 108 stations serving 15 million viewers in 1952 to 510 stations
serving 44 million viewers in 1959. Id. at 79(a).
25. M. HAMBURG, supra note 4, at § 1.15.
26. See, e.g., Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1439 (modem cable systems can handle
more than 100 channels). See also Programmers Show Off Ideas for Cable TV, Wall St.
J., Oct. 14, 1981, at 31, col. 2.
27. Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1439.
28. Miller & Beals, Regulating Cable Television, 57 WASH. L. REv. 85, 88 n.13
(1981). Cable television performs communicative and noncommunicative services.
Noncommunicative services include: security monitoring, (burglar, fire, and police
alarms); remote computer terminals providing access to a vast array of computer pro-
grams and data bases; medical monitoring; meter reading and transactional services
such as home shopping and banking. Id.
29. Congress established the Federal Communications Commission with the Com-
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creasingly scrutinized cable TV.3" In early years, the FCC was lax in
its regulation3 due to the complete lack of evidence establishing a link
between the importation of television broadcast signals via cable and
the economic viability of local broadcasting.3 2 Cable fulfilled an FCC
objective by disseminating information to those unable to receive
broadcast television.33
Beginning in the 1960's the FCC became increasingly active in regu-
lating the cable industry.34 The Commission determined that cable
television might pose an economic threat to local broadcasters.3 5 Spe-
cifically, the FCC was concerned that cable operators would divert ad-
vertising revenue from local educational television, thus threatening
the economic viability of existing stations and discouraging potential
entrants. 36 The FCC determined that the improved service cable
promised did not justify the elimination of local broadcasters.37
munications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-757 (1982)), in order to "make available so far as possible, to all the people of
the United States a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and world-wide wire and radio commu-
nication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges .... ." 47 U.S.C. § 151.
Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1439.
30. For a description of the FCC's initial regulation of cable and its goals, See
Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 167-78; P. PARSONS, supra note 21, at 12, 13. For a
discussion of FCC cable regulation during the last three decades, see Quincy Cable, 768
F.2d at 1438-43; P. PARSONS, supra note 21, at 15-27.
31. Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1439.
32. P. PARSONS, supra note 21, at 12, 13.
33. P. PARSONS, supra note 21, at 11-13.
34. The FCC's "first movement" in the cable area was in 1962. P. PARSONS, supra
note 21, at 15. Prior to the 1960's, however, the FCC refused to become involved in
cable TV issues. See, e.g., Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV
Translators, TV "Satellite" Stations, and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development of
Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403, 415, 421-22 (1959). See also Carroll Broadcast-
ing v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The FCC granted a license without first
determining whether licensing a second station would be detrimental to the public inter-
est. The FCC believed that Congress intended free market forces to decide the survi-
vors in the broadcast industry. Only in rare circumstances did the FCC intervene to
prevent the natural effects of legal competition. Id at 442.
35. P. PARSONS, supra note 21, at 15.
36. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157, 167-68 (the FCC has authority under the
Federal Communications Act of 1934 to regulate the cable television industry).
37. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 173-78. The Court noted the Commission's
fear that cable might be dividing available audiences and revenues, thereby significantly
exacerbating the financial difficulties of UHF and educational stations. Id at 175-77
nn.43-44. The Commission also feared that through "cream skimming," servicing only
a small profitable segment of the market, rural areas and small towns might be left
without any service. Id The Commission felt that the loss of local stations would
1988]
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To protect local stations, the Commission adopted "must carry
rules"38 requiring cable systems to carry local broadcasts.3 9 The FCC
also prohibited cable systems from transmitting distant signals which
duplicated local programming. 4 0 In United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co.,41 the Supreme Court upheld these regulations as "reason-
ably ancillary" to the FCC's purpose of protecting local broadcasts.42
In 1969 the Commission adopted a rule requiring cable systems with
more than 3,500 subscribers to carry some local programming.43 The
Supreme Court narrowly upheld this rule in 1972 in United States v.
seriously diminish the benefits of broadcast television, thus adversely affecting the pub-
lic. Id at 176 n.44.
38. "Must carry rules" required a cable operator to include local broadcast signals
with cable's programming. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.5, 76.51, 76.53, 76.55, 76.56, 76.58
(1987) (description of which broadcast signals are considered local and must be carried
with cable's programming).
39. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 32 F.C.C. 459, 464-65 (1962),
aff'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963) (the D.C. Circuit
upheld the FCC's initial attempt to impose "must carry rules" on cable operator).
CATV, Second Report and Order in Docket No. 14,895, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). The
Commission's objective was to allow for the development of cable technology without
undermining the financial well-being of "free, community-oriented television." Quincy
Cable, 768 F.2d at 1440. The Commission believed that if cable could exploit and dis-
place broadcast television in the free market, the loss of the industry would seriously
hurt the public. Id.
The Court recognized the preservation of local broadcasting as a congressional objec-
tive. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 174. Congress' mandate required that the FCC
create "[a] system of local broadcasting stations, such that 'all communities of apprecia-
ble size [will] have at least one television station as an outlet for local self-expression.'"
Id at 174 (footnote omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1559, 87th Cong., 2d Sss. 3
(1962)). This objective of protecting and fostering local television continues to enjoy
support today. See Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454 n.43.
40. CATV, Second Report and Order in Docket No. 14,895, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 798
(1966) (importation of signals which duplicate local programming are prohibited if the
programming had been shown the day before, the same day, or day after).
41. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
42. Id at 178. The Court did not consider the first amendment rights of cable oper-
ators; instead, the Court labeled the cable industry as a passive transmitter of signals
rather than an originator of speech. Id at 161-62. See supra notes 22, 29 and 30. See
also Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398-400 (1968).
The "must carry rules" were recently struck down by the D.C. Circuit as in violation of
the first amendment. See supra notes 31, 36. See generally Lee, Cable Franchising,
supra note 3; Lively, Fear and the Media: A First Amendment Horror Show, 69 MINN.
L. REv. 1071 (1985).
43. CATV, First Report and Order in Docket No. 18,397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969);
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 671-75, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 898
(1972).
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Midwest Video Corp.' The Commission repealed the rule two yedrs
later.
The FCC's subsequent attempts to expand regulation of cable televi-
sion have proved less successful. In 1976 the Commission promulgated
new rules requiring cable television systems with 3,500 subscribers to
have 20-channel capacity by 1985, to make certain access channels
available without charge, and to furnish equipment for access pur-
poses.4" In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (II), 4 the Supreme Court held
that the Commission did not have authority to impose these new re-
quirements.47 Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia struck down as overbroad FCC regulations
prohibiting the broadcast on pay cable systems of certain sporting
events and recent feature films, unless conventional television broad-
casters previously rejected programs.48
44. 406 U.S. 649, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 898 (1972).
45. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (II), 440 U.S. 689, 691, (1979). "[T]he [FCC]
promulgated rules requiring cable television systems that have 3,500 or more subscrib-
ers and carry broadcast signals to develop, at a minimum, a 20-channel capacity by
1986, to make available certain channels for access by third parties, [for example, public
educational, local governmental, and leased-access views,] and to furnish equipment
and facilities for access purposes." Id The rules deprive cable operators of all discre-
tion regarding what will be programmed. Id. The Court upheld the regulations, finding
them reasonably ancillary to the FCC's authority to regulate cable television and in the
public interest under the 1934 Communications Act. Id
46. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
47. Id. at 700-07. The Court recognized that Midwest Video (I) sustained the FCC's
authority to regulate cable television with the affirmative purpose of promoting goals
pursued in the regulation of television broadcasting. Id. at 700. The Court dete.anined
that with its access rule, however, the Commission transferred control of the content of
access channels away from cable operators. Id. In so doing, the Court found that the
Commission exceeded the scope of authority granted to it by Congress because Con-
gress restricted the FCC's "ability to advance objectives associated with public access at
the expense of the journalistic freedom of person engaged in broadcasting." Id at 707.
48. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977). The FCC argued that pay cable subscribers might buy away pro-
gramming from broadcasters, thereby denying the majority of viewers access to pro-
gramming. 567 F.2d at 21. The court invalidated the rules on the ground that the
FCC: (1) acted beyond its jurisdiction because it failed to show that the restraints were
reasonably ancillary to the Commission's broadcasting regulation, and (2) had arbitrar-
ily narrowed the scope of the issues in the hearings on the rules by defining the problem
as "how cablecasting can best be regulated to provide a beneficial supplement to the
over-the-air broadcasting." Id at 26. The siphoning evidence was inadequate, espe-
cially viewed against the disparity of resources between the cable and broadcast indus-
tries. Id. at 36-40. Moreover, the court found that the Commission's position that
cablecasting "must be a supplement to, rather than an equal of, broadcast television"
was "capricious." Id. at 36.
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The trend of recent cases and governmental actions addressing cable
television regulation signals a significant reduction in the FCC's role in
regulating the cable industry.49 For example, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals struck down the FCC "must carry rules" upheld ear-
lier on different grounds in Southwestern Cable.50 In Quincy Cable v.
FCC,5 the court held that the "must carry rules" violate the first
amendment rights of cable operators52 because of the potential risk of
content regulation.53 In Malrite T. V of New York v. FCC,54 the Sec-
ond Circuit, contrary to Southwestern Cable, held that cable TV would
not spell the doom for local television." Thus, one of the primary rea-
sons for cable regulation vanished.56
B. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
Local governments have historically regulated cable television
49. P. PARSONS, supra note 21, at 22.
50. Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169
(1986). The D.C. Circuit found that the courts never directly addressed the constitu-
tionality of "must carry rules." Id at 1443.
51. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
52. Id at 1453. The Circuit Court also found that the FCC failed to adequately
justify its regulations and that the regulations were not narrowly tailored to achieve the
FCC's end. Id at 1462-63. In addition to holding that the "must carry rules" deprived
the cable operator of the guaranteed freedom to select programming, the court found
that the rules might operate to deny programmers of a market. Id. The court reasoned
that if a municipality required a substantial number of local cable channels to carry
local broadcast signals, the cable station's own preferences for programming would be
secondary. The court concluded that this deprivation of the cable channel's ability to
compete afforded the programmer standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
rules. Id at 1445 n.24.
53. Id at 1452-54. The court noted that the "[rules] favor one speaker over an-
other" and "impinge on editorial discretion." Id at 1453.
54. 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
55. In 1980 the Commission repealed its distant signal and exclusivity regulations.
652 F.2d at 1147.
56. The court noted that "[flree television... limits program diversity by its con-
centration on mass audience shows, which make advertising worthwhile. In shifting its
policy toward a more favorable regulatory climate for the cable industry, the FCC has
chosen a balance of television services that should increase program diversity, a valid
FCC regulatory goal." Id at 1151. The "FCC dismantled large portions of the exten-
sive regulatory structure under which both broadcast and cable television have labored
for many decades." Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1455. The Quincy Cable court noted
that this action was a result of the FCC's belief that the public interest in diversity is
best served by allowing the market place to decide. Id
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through the franchise process." Generally, a municipality will issue a
franchise to a cable operator, thereby granting it exclusive access to
public property to construct and operate a cable television system."
Even though regulations usually allow for one or more franchises, mu-
nicipalities customarily issue only one cable franchise for a geographic
area.
59
Congress provided a model for cable franchising in the Cable Com-
munication Act of 1984 (Cable Act).6' The two overriding objectives
of the Cable Act are to regulate cable television via the franchising
process and to fulfill the public interest in securing the greatest diver-
sity of information possible.61 Congress intended the Act to establish
cable regulation guidelines for federal, state, and local authorities.62
Congress further intended that through the Act's framework, the cable
industry would achieve the "stability and certainty" essential to its
growth.63
The Cable Act requires a cable operator to obtain a franchise before
57. See supra note 2. See also, Note, Cable Franchising and the First Amendment:
Does the Franchising Process Contravene First Amendment Rights? 36 FED. COM. L.J.
317, 323-24 (1984). A municipality's power to regulate cable is based on its need to
regulate public areas, streets and alleys, and the municipality's police power to protect
the health and safety of its citizens. lIL
58. See Lee, Cable Franchising, supra note 3, at 871-73 for a detailed discussion of a
typical franchise auctioning process. Id The author reveals the municipality's blatant
disregard for the first amendment rights of cable operators and urges that first amend-
ment protections must extend to the franchise allotment process. Lee argues that mu-
nicipalities grant only one franchise in order to extract as many conditions as possible
from a cable operator. Id These conditions include access channels and rate regula-
tion. Id. Due to the demands, cable operators' bids are contingent on receiving an
exclusive franchise. L
59. One survey showed that of the 4,200 cities with cable television, 99.7% had only
one franchise. Noam, Towards An Integrated Communications Market--Overcoming
the Local Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. COM. L.J. 209, 242 n.148 (1982).
60. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (Supp. 111984). Cable Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkin-
son, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985) aff'd, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 107
S. Ct. 1559 (1987) (Cable Act preempts Utah cable act). The Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act) is contained in title 6 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended. The Communications Act of 1934 is codified in scattered sections of
title 47 of the United States Code. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4655 (legislative history and
purpose of the Cable Act).
61. Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni Enterprises, 633 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Del. 1986).
62. 47 U.S.C. § 521(3) (Supp. 11 1984).
63. 47 U.S.C. § 521(2) (Supp. II1984); H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4455, 4657. The stated purposes
of the Act are to:
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it can offer cable service.' The Act then authorizes the franchising
authority to award "one or more franchises within its jurisdiction." 65
This provision allows the franchising authority to determine the proper
number of cable operators for an area. Once granted a franchise, a
cable operator has the authority to construct a cable system over public
rights of way and through easements within the area to be serviced.66
The cable operator is responsible for protecting the safety and conven-
ience of the public.67
The Cable Act requires the operator to include commercial use
channels with the system. To achieve Congress' goal of assuring that
the communications medium provides the widest possible range of in-
formation to the public, the Act demands that the operator devote a
fixed percentage of its channel capacity to commercial use by individu-
als unaffiliated with the operator.6 The operator cannot exercise any
editorial control over the content of programming on commercial use
channels. 69 While Congress apparently extended first amendment pro-
tection to the cable industry, its concerns for diversity are meaningless
without safeguarding access to the local market. To insure the greatest
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications;
(2) establish franchise procedures and standards which encourage the.growth
and development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are respon-
sive to the needs and interests of the local community;
(3) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local authority
with respect to the regulation of cable system;
(4) assure that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide the
widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public;
(5) establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which protects cable oper-
ators against unfair denials of renewal where the operator's past performance and
proposal for future performance meet the standards established by this title; and
(6) promote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary
regulation that would impose an undue economic burden on cable systems.
Cable Act, § 601 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521) (Supp. 11 1984).
64. 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
65. The term "franchising authority" refers to "any government entity empowered
by Federal, State, or local law to grant a franchise." 47 U.S.C. § 522(9) (Supp. 111984).
66. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1984). In using such easements, the cable
operator must ensure the safety and convenience of the public and repay the owner of
property for any damages caused by the installation or operation of the system. 47
U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)(A)-(C) (Supp. 11 1984).
68. 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1984). For specified percentage requirements
see 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1)(A)-(E) (Supp. 111984).
69. 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
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diversity possible, Congress should have explicitly extended first
amendment guarantees to the franchise process itself.
II. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
The Ninth Circuit's use of the public forum doctrine is a useful legal
theory for cable operators who contest a municipality's effort to restrict
access to public property. The public forum doctrine provides speakers
with nondiscriminatory access, for first amendment purposes, to public
places traditionally used for expressive conduct.70
While the first amendment protects the right of free speech, it does
not absolutely guarantee free speech on public property.71 Histori-
cally, a state's ability to limit free expression depended on the nature of
the property or forum to which a speaker sought access.72 The
Supreme Court identified three classifications of forums.7 3 The classifi-
cation of the particular property where access is sought will determine
the degree to which a municipality can restrict access,7 4 and thus cur-
tail expressive activity.
In Davis v. Massachusetts,75 the Supreme Court rendered its first
public forum decision. Davis was convicted of delivering a sermon in a
Boston Park without the required city permit.76 The Court relied on a
70. See generally Werham, The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the
Return of Formalism, 7 CARDozo L. RV. 335 (1986) (background and history of pub-
lic forum doctrine).
71. See, eg., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985)
(the Constitution does not preclude the government from prohibiting "access to all who
wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of government property");
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981) (access to property is not guaranteed solely because it is owned by the govern-
ment); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (first amendment does not allow
protesters to express their views wherever they want).
See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the
"fairness doctrine" as applied to broadcaster and basing the government's right to regu-
late the content of broadcast editorials on the medium's scarcity of spectrum space);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (the goal of the first amendment
is to promote the widest possible dissemination of information).
The Court has held that even where the first amendment guarantees access, reason-
able time, place, and manner regulations may restrict a would-be speaker's actions. See,
e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
72. Id.
73. Id at 45-46. See infra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
74. 460 U.S. at 45-46. See infra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
75. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
76. Id at 43. Davis argued that the park is the property of all the inhabitants of
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property theory to affirm Davis' conviction." The Court found that
Davis might have a constitutional right to preach, but not on city prop-
erty."8 Davis' right to preach in the park could exist only if he held a
property interest superior to the city's.79 The Court found that Davis
had no superior property interest.
The theory of the Davis opinion illustrates the Court's early view of
the public forum doctrine. While the first amendment protects free
speech, it is not necessarily a basis for a right of access to government
property. o The relevant inquiry of the Court "concerned property
ownership, not free expression.""1
In Hague v. C.1 o.,82 the Supreme Court extended greater protection
to expressive conduct in streets and parks.83 In a passage which be-
came the foundation of the public forum doctrine, Justice Roberts
wrote:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a
part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and
parks for communication of views on national questions may be
regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and
must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it
must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.8 4
The labor union in Hague objected to the city's denial of permits for
Boston, and as such is dedicated to the use of these people. IM at 46. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, held that "for the
Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public
park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the
owners of a private house to forbid it in his house." Commonwealth v. Davis, 162
Mass. 510, 511 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
77. 167 U.S. at 48.
78. Id at 46-48.
79. Id
80. Werham, supra note 70, at 346.
81. Id
82. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
83. Id at 515-16.
84. Hague, the mayor of Jersey City, New Jersey, attempted to attract business to
the city by promising to prevent labor unions from organizing. Id. at 501.
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public meetings and the distribution of literature, particularly in light
of the mayor's encouragement and sponsorship of parades and meet-
ings of anti-union advocates.8 5 The Court found that the city's favorit-
ism violated the labor union's right to free speech.
6
Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts raised the issue of regulating,
free speech in streets and parks to the constitutional level of "privileges
and immunities" protected by the fourteenth amendment.8 7 The Court
found free speech in parks and streets to be a right protected by the
first amendment.88
Despite the apparent inconsistencies between the two cases, Hague
did not overrule Davis. 9 Cases decided after Hague attest to Davis'
continuing importance." For certain types of property the reasoning
of Davis still controls today,91 but Hague explicitly announced an ex-
ception for streets and parks.9 2 In the years following Hague, the
Court consistently protected a person's right to speak in streets and
parks.9" The public forum doctrine evolved from these cases.94
In the last 20 years, the Court has encountered almost every type of
public property as the subject of public forum litigation. Litigants have
sought access to military bases, train stations, and public office build-
85. Gibbons, Hague v. CIO: A Retrospective, 52 N.Y. U.L. REv. 731, 732-33
(1977).
86. Hague, 307 U.S. at 516.
87. See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515. One author concluded that Hague recognized "that
when the citizen goes into the street, he is a exercising a immemorial right of a free man,
a kind of First-Amendment easement in streets and parks." Kalven, The Concept of the
Public Forum, Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 13. Kalven, writing in light of
the civil rights protests of the sixties, discussed whether the city could prohibit demon-
strators from using streets and parks to make their case to preserve other uses of public
thoroughfares.
88. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-17.
89. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 ("[W]e have no occasion to determine whether.., the
Davis case was rightly decided, but we cannot agree that it rules the instant case . .
Id
90. Several courts cited Davis during the 1940's and 1950's. See, e.g., Fowler v.
Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 68-69 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 279
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
91. This property is within the nonpublic forum category of public property. See
infra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
92. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-17 (1939).
93. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
94. See Kalven, supra note 87, at 13.
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ings for first amendment purposes.9" The Court's attempt to reconcile
or distinguish these fora from the "streets and parks" cases96 has re-
sulted in the inconsistent and confusing application of the public forum
doctrine. In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educator's As-
sociation 97 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the law of the pub-
lie forum.
In Perry, a public school system granted the incumbent labor union
exclusive access to the interschool mail system and the teachers' school
mailboxes.9 8 A rival union brought suit alleging that the current
union's exclusive access to the mail system violated its first amendment
right.99 The rival union contended that the mailboxes constituted a
public forum, and therefore the first amendment protected its right of
access.l ° ° The Supreme Court held that the mailboxes were not a pub-
lic forum. 10'
Writing for the Court, Justice White established three categories of
public property: public forum by tradition, public forum by designa-
tion, and nonpublic forum.102 Each respective type of property re-
ceives a distinct level of judicial scrutiny for restrictions on access.
The first two categories contain "public" forum.'0 3 The first cate-
95. See, ag., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); (Court denied litigants access to a
military base); Knolls Action Project v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 771 F.2d 46
(2d Cir. 1985) (speaker sought access to nuclear power plant); Southeastern Promotions
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal theater); Widemar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981) (university meeting facilities); City of Madison Joint School District v. Wiscon-
sin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board meet-
ing); Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37 (1983)
(Court denied rival union access to school mail boxes); Gaunett Satellite Information
Network v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984) (subway station);
Wright v. Chief of Transit Police, 558 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1977).
96. The cases that explicitly analogized to streets and parks typically mentioned a
characteristic or two that streets and parks did or did not have in common with the
property at issue. See, e.g., Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 538
F.2d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 1976) (mailboxes do not resemble thoroughfares); Moskowitz v.
Uliman, 432 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (D.N.J. 1977) (subway terminal, like street, is used by
thousands of travelers each day).
97. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
98. Id. at 39-41.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 44-48.
101. Id. at 53. The Court also rejected the rival union's equal protection claims
under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 54-55.
102. Id. at 4546:
103. Id
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gory, traditional public forum, includes public property which citizens
have long used for assembly and debate."° The Court noted this cate-
gory includes streets and parks.10 5 The Court applied strict scrutiny to
evaluate restrictions on access to these properties.10 6 Therefore, only
restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest are
constitutional. 0 7 Justice White noted that a state may adopt time,
place, and manner restrictions which "are content neutral, are nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication."10 8
The second category, public forum by designation, consists of those
public properties that the state has "opened" as sites for communica-
tive activity." 9 These include theaters, auditoriums, and meeting facil-
ities. ° Similar to property in the first category, first amendment
rights in a designated public forum are also afforded strict scrutiny
protection. 111
A nonpublic forum includes all public property not included in the
104. Id.
105. Id. The Court used the first category for public property which traditionally
or by government fiat was devoted to the public's use for assembly and debate. Id. The
Court adopted the Hague test to determine what property falls within this classification.
Id. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
106. Id. at 45.
107. Id. The Court held that the interschool mail systems were not a public forum
and supported its conclusion by pointing to the fact that the mail systems are not open
to the public and are only intended to serve the teachers' internal communication needs.
Id. at 46.
108. Id
109. Id at 45-46. The second category "consists of public property which the state
has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity." Id
110. Id. (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. 263; City of Madison, 429 U.S. 167; Southeastern
Promotions, 420 U.S. 546). The court stated that public property opened for a segment
of the public becomes a public forum even if the local government was not originally
required to open it. 460 U.S. at 45-46.
111. Id. at 46. "Although a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open
character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply
in a traditional public forum." Id It appears that a city may transform a designated
public forum into a nonpublic forum. Id. The Court found that the school's selective
access to its mall facilities by opening it up to outside groups did not transform it into a
public forum accessible to the general public. Id. The Court found that the school
opened its mail system for a limited purpose which did not create a general right of
access. Id. at 47-48. Also, the Court held the restriction constitutional because it was
reasonable and was not a form of viewpoint discrimination, Id. at 48-55.
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first two categories.1 12 Reasonable and viewpoint neutral restrictions
on access to this property are constitutional. 113 Thus, the state can
enact time, place, and manner regulations. Like Davis, the Court
found that the state may preserve its property similar to a private prop-
erty owner. 114
In Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent,"5 the Supreme Court considered the appropriate public forum
characterization for public utility poles. 6 Vincent was a candidate for
public office, whose supporters put campaign signs on the city's utility
poles. 17 The city removed the signs pursuant to a city regulation
prohibiting the posting of signs on public property. 18 The supporters
brought suit, asking the Court to bar the sign removal. They alleged,
in part, that utility poles located on streets are a public forum.1 1 9 The
city sought to validate the regulation, arguing that the signs were an
unsightly blemish.'20
The Vincent Court found the telephone poles and lamp posts to be
neither traditional nor designated public fora,'21 determined that the
112. Id at 46. The third category, "nonpublic forum," consists of property which
is not a traditional public forum nor a designated public forum. Id.
113. Id
114. Id
115. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
116. Id at 813-16. The Court found that § 28.04 of the Los Angeles Municipal
Code, which prohibits the posting of signs on public property, was constitutional on its
face and was not substantially overbroad. Id. at 796-803. The Court noted that govern-
ment time, place, and manner regulations of speech are permissible when four condi-
tions are met. Id. at 804-05 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 20 L. Ed. 2d
672, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968)). The regulation must be within the government's constitu-
tional power; it must further an important or substantial government interest; the gov-
erment interest must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression;" and
"incidental restrictions on alleged First Amendment freedoms" must be "no greater
than [are] essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id.
The Court found that in this case the government's interest, advancing aesthetic val-
ues, was sufficiently substantial to justify the effect of the ordinance on the campaign
workers' speech, and that the restrictions were no greater than necessary to achieve the
city's purpose. Id at 807-11. Important to the result was that numerous alternative
routes were available by which the campaign workers could convey their message. Id.
at 812.
117. Id at 792-93.
118. Id. at 793.
119. Id. at 813.
120. Id. at 795.
121. Id. at 814. The Court repeated its oft-quoted line that "the First Amendment
does not guarantee access to government property simply because it is owned or con-
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property was a nonpublic forum,122 and concluded that the ordinance
was constitutional.1 2
3
The Court questioned whether the public forum doctrine provided
the proper framework for deciding cases involving tangible prop-
erty, 124 noting that "[i]t is of limited utility in the context of this case
to focus on whether the tangible property itsclf should be deemed a
public forum."' 125
The Supreme Court further refined its public forum analysis in Cor-
nelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.126 In Corne-
lius, various legal defense and political advocacy groups127 challenged
the constitutionality of a presidential order which excluded them from
participating in the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC). 128 The order
excluded the plaintiffs from participation in fund raising activities oc-
trolled by the government." Id (quoting United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)). The Court noted that property is not a public
forum solely because a speaker can use it for communicative purposes. Id The Court
argued that any tangible government property "could be used to communicate." Id at
814 n.31.
122. Id. at 814-15.
123. Id. at 815. The Court found that the statute served a reasonable purpose, it
was viewpoint neutral, and alternative methods of communication were available. Id
124. Id at 815 n.32.
125. Id The Court reasoned that the constitutionality of time, place, and manner
restrictions where "First Amendment rights may be exercised in a traditional public
forum," and the question of whether public land constitutes a public forum "may blur
at the edges." Id (quoting Greenburgh Civic, 453 U.S. 114, 132).
126. 473 U.S. 788 (1985). The Court's public forum analysis serves as a model to
judge the Ninth Circuit's application of the doctrine. See infra notes 192-202.
127. The groups challenging the Executive Order in this case were the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Federally Employed Women
Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Indian Law Resource Center, the Lawyer's
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Natural Resources Defense Council.
The common characteristic is that each group attempts to sway public policy through
one or more of the following means: political activity, advocacy, lobbying, and litiga-
tion on behalf of others. 473 U.S. at 793.
128. Idt at 792. CFC is an annual fundraising drive among federal employees con-
ducted during working hours at the federal workplace. Id. at 790. Participating organi-
zations submit 30 word statements included in the campaign literature which then is
distributed to federal employees. The Executive Order limited the organizations per-
mitted to participate in the CFC to "voluntary charitable health and welfare agencies
that provide or support direct health and welfare services to individuals or their fami-
lies." I. at 795. The Executive Order specifically excluded the legal defense and polit-
ical advocacy organizations that challenged the regulations. Id. The CFC was created
to reduce the government's burden in meeting employees' health and welfare needs by
19881
Washington University Open Scholarship
372 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 34:353
curring in federal office buildings, but did not exclude nonprofit, direct
health and welfare organizations. The plaintiffs claimed this exclusion
violated their first amendment rights.129 The Supreme Court set forth
a method for applying the public forum doctrine.' The Court found
that it must first identify the relevant forum.' The majority opined
that a court must consider more than the relevant government prop-
erty when identifying the relevant forum. 132 The proper focus is the
access sought by the speaker. 133 The relevant forum in Cornelius was
the CFC rather than the federal workplace. 134
Next, the Court determined whether the CFC was a public forum. 135
After stating the CFC was not a traditional public forum, the Court
providing a convenient, nondisruptive channel for federal employees to contribute to
nonpartisan agencies that directly serve those needs. Id
129. Id at 795-796. The Court's blueprint for resolving this issue includes four
considerations: (1) Is the speech protected, (2) what is the relevant forum, (3) is it a
public forum, and (4) whether the government's justifications for exclusion from the
relevant forum satisfy the requisite standard. Id at 797.
The respondents brought an action in federal court challenging the constitutionality
of their exclusion under the Executive Order. Id. at 795. The respondents contended
that the order violated their first amendment right to solicit charitable contributions
and that "the denial of the right to participate in undesignated funds violates their
rights under the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 795-96.
The respondent also contended that the direct services requirement was vague. Id. at
796.
130. The Court determined that charitable solicitation of funds is a form of pro-
tected speech. Id at 797-99.
131. Id at 800. The petitioner asserted that the relevant forum "consists of tangible
government property," in this case the federal workplace. Id. at 800-01. Respondent
contended that the court should define the relevant forum "in terms of the access sought
by the speaker." Id. at 801. Therefore, the respondent maintained that the CFC is the
relevant forum. Id.
132. Id The Court found that the relevant forum may be either the property to
which a speaker seeks access or a more narrowly defined property. When a speaker
seeks general access to public property the appropriate forum is the property. Id. (cit-
ing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)) (a military base to which a speaker sought
access was the relevant forum).
"In cases in which more limited access is sought," the Court found that it must iden-
tify the relevant forum through a narrowly tailored approach. Id. (citing Perry Educa-
tion Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37) (for a rival school union mail system, the relevant forum was
the school's internal mail system and the school's mailboxes); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (where the speaker sought to advertise on city owned
buses, the advertising space on the buses constituted the relevant forum).
133. 473 U.S. at 8900-01. The Court found that the "respondents [sought] access to
a particular means of communication," not general access to the property. Id.
134. Id,
135. Id. at 802.
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focused on whether the property was a public forum by designation. 13 6
To resolve this issue the Court considered both the government's intent
when it created the CFC and the nature of the property.' 37 The Court
noted that it could infer a governmental intent to create a public forum
through the government's operation and policy in regard to the
CFC. 38 Furthermore, a governmental intent to create a public forum
existed if the property lent itself to expressive activity.' 39 The Court
found that the CFC was a nonpublic forum."
In a nonpublic forum, the Cornelius Court held that a regulation
must be viewpoint neutral, there must be reasonable alternative means
available for the speaker to reach the intended audience, and the regu-
lation must be reasonable in light of the forum's purpose.14 1 The Court
found that the statute satisfied all of these requirements. 142
136. Neither party contended that the CFC constituted a traditional public forum.
Id. at 804. The respondents argued that the "[g]overnment created a limited public
forum for use by all charitable organizations to solicit funds from federal employees."
Id. Petitioner contended that neither the government's "practice nor its policy [was]
consistent with an intent to designate the CFC as a public forum open to all tax-exempt
organizations." Id.
137. Id. at 802. The Court noted that a government cannot create a public forum
by "inaction or permitting limited discourse"; rather, a government may only create a
public forum by "intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse."
Id.
To determine if the government has created a public forum, the Court reviews "the
policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a
place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum." Id. Further
evidence of government's intent stems from the Court's analysis of "nature of the prop-
erty and its compatibility with expressive activity." Idl
138. Id. at 802. The Court found that the government's policy "has been to limit
participation in the CFC to 'appropriate' voluntary agencies and to require agencies
seeking admission to obtain permission." Id. at 804. The Court determined that such
"selective access, unsupported by evidence of a purposeful designation for public use,
does not create a public forum." Id at 805. Furthermore, the history of the CFC
showed that it was designed to reduce distractions in the workplace by limiting solicita-
tions. The CFC lessens the amount of expressive activity occurring on federal property.
Id.
139. The Court strengthened its conclusion that the CFC is a nonpublic forum by
examining the nature of the government property. Id at 805. The Court reasoned that
the purpose of the federal workplace is to allow its employees to fulfill their duties. The
government employer has great discretion in deciding office rules and procedures, in-
cluding the right to minimize distractions. Id. at 805-06.
140. Id. at 806.
141. Id.
142. Id at 808-09.
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III. THE Preferred Communications Decision
The City of Los Angeles controlled the development and operation
of cable television through a franchise auction process. 143 The city
prohibited companies from offering cable service without first ob-
taining a cable franchise. 1" With the approval145 of the State legisla-
ture, utilities throughout California designated excess space for cable
operators' use.14 6
Preferred Communications, Inc. (PCI), a corporation created for the
purpose of providing cable service in Los Angeles, approached two
California utilities to negotiate a contract for the use of their surplus
poles and conduit space.14 7 Both utilities refused to negotiate with PCI
because the company had failed to obtain a cable franchise from the
city. 148 PCI attempted to rectify the situation by petitioning the city
for a franchise.' 4 9 The city declined PCI's request because the com-
pany neglected to compete in the franchise process.150
PCI attempted to vindicate its rights in federal court by alleging that
the refusal of the utility companies and city to allow PCI to operate a
cable system deprived the company of its right to free speech under the
143. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1400. The Los Angeles franchise system authorized by
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53066 (West Supp. 1984) is similar to Congress' Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984. Id at 1400. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text
for a description of the Cable Act.
144. 754 F.2d at 1400. The city required interested companies to compete in a city
auction for franchises and submit to a number of conditions. Id. The city demanded a
prospective cable operator to pay a $10,000 filing fee, a $500 good faith deposit, and to
agree to reimburse the city up to $60,000 for holding the auction. Id. Furthermore, the
city required companies to provide detailed descriptions of their business plans, experi-
ence, and qualifications. Id The city obligated the successful bidder to provide the city
with a percentage of future revenues, provide a variety of services, and make available a
specified number of access channels. Id For more specific terms and obligations of a
franchise contract, see id at 1400-01.
The city evaluated all bids and determined which company would "be best for each
area" of the city, and granted an exclusive cable franchise for each region. Id. at 1401.
145. Id (citing CAL. PUB. UnL. CODE § 767.5(b) (West Supp. 1984)).
146. Id
147. Id at 1400. PCI planned to connect its equipment "to existing public utility
facilities-poles and conduits located on property owned in fee by the utility and on or
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first and fourteenth amendments.1 51 The district court found the city's
franchising system constitutional as a matter of law. 15
2
The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, finding that
the city's franchise process violated the first amendment.153 The court
determined that the city could not grant an exclusive cable franchise
when surplus space for accommodating additional systems existed.154
The court analyzed the constitutionality of the franchise process by
examining (1) the unique economic and physical characteristics of the
cable medium, (2) the government's interest in preventing the disrup-
tion of the public domain, and (3) cable operators' access rights under
the public forum doctrine. 55
The court initially focused on cable television's first amendment sta-
tus by comparing the industry's physical and economic attributes to
those of the print and broadcast media. 15 6 The Ninth Circuit found
that the government's wide latitude in regulating broadcast television
does not extend to its power to regulate cable television.157 The court
refused to apply the physical scarcity rationale, which justifies the reg-
ulation of broadcast television, to cable. 5 ' The court also rejected the
151. Ia at 1401.
152. Id at 1399. As well as the free speech allegation, PCI raised federal antitrust
and state law claims. Id
153. Id The court also determined that the "city was immune from antitrust liabil-
ity under the state action exemption established in Parker v. Brown, [317 U.S. 341
(1943)]." Id The district court also dismissed PCI's state law claims. 754 F.2d at
1399.
154. Id. at 1411. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling on PCI's antitrust claims. Id. at 1399.
155. Id. The court described the issue before it:
Can the City, consistent with the First Amendment, limit access by means of an
auction process to a given region of the City to a single cable television company,
when the public utility facilities and other public property in that region necessary
to the installation and operation of a cable television system are physically capable
of accommodating more than one system?
Id. at 1401.
PCI raised a bevy of first amendment attacks against the auction process. Id PCI
maintained that its right to offer cable services should not be contingent on competing
in the auction process or obtaining the city's approval. Id
The city urged that its cable franchising system was justified by its need to prevent
disruption on public land, "the fact that cable is a natural monopoly and the physical
scarcity of available space on public utility structures .. " Id. at 1402.
156. Id. at 1403.
157. Id. See supra notes 12-14.
158. 754 F.2d at 1403. The court noted that the physical scarcity of the air waves,
which justifies the regulation of broadcasters, is inapplicable to cable. Id A cable oper-
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city's contention that economic scarcity justified the franchise process,
i.e., that cable is a natural monopoly.159 The court indicated that the
economic burdens a speaker faces in attempting to enter the cable mar-
ket are irrelevant for first amendment purposes. 160 Similar to the print
media, the city cannot base its regulation of cable on the market's in-
ability to support additional cable operators. 161
The court next considered whether disruption of public property
could justify the city's franchise process.1 62 The city maintained that
the regulations affected noncommunicative aspects of speech and were
necessary to minimize disruption to the public domain.163 Govern-
ment regulation of noncommunicative aspects of speech is constitution-
ally permissible when the regulation is reasonable. 1 4 A regulation is
reasonable
if it is within the constitutional power of the government; if it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the gov-
ernmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ator's ability to disseminate information is not lessened by an increase in the number of
cable speakers as is a broadcaster due to frequency interference. Id. The court noted it
was not deciding the case where public property is incapable of accommodating more
systems. Id. at 1409. The court found that the city's allegations below failed to support
a finding that physical limitations justified increased regulation of cable operators. Id.
at 1403-04.
159. Id. at 1404. See, eg., Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 127, in which the Court
rejected the notion that cable operators suffer from the same physical limitations as
broadcasters.
160. Id. The Court found that due to the case's procedural posture, it had to accept
PCI's allegation "that competition for cable services is economically feasible in the Los
Angeles area." Id
161. Id. See supra note 13 for a discussion of the Court's determination that eco-
nomic barriers do not justify government regulations which restrict the print media's
access to a market. The Court suggested that circuits which have upheld a city's regula-
tion on cable under an economic scarcity rationale are really focusing on cable's disrup-
tion to public property. 745 F.2d at 1404. See supra note 13 for a discussion of the
circuits upholding such regulations. The Preferred court contended that the Tenth Cir-
cuit's view, espoused in Community Communications, that cable's disruption to city
property necessitated a franchise process, also "justified the monopoly the city [sought]
to create by its auction process." 660 F.2d at 1379.
162. Id In Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241, the Court rejected the view that economic
conditions could justify the government's interference with the press. See supra note 13
for a discussion of economic constraints.
163. 754 F.2d at 1405.
164. Id.
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ance of that interest.165
The court agreed with the city that cable television requires the use
of public facilities and thus necessitates governmental regulation.
166
The city has legitimate interests in protecting public safety and al-
lowing traffic to move freely.' 67 The Ninth Circuit concurred that the
special problems cable presents justify regulating use and inconven-
ience; however, the court found that the city was attempting to restrict
access. 16' The court concluded that the city's interests did not justify
the risk that city officials might grant access based upon a particular
cable operator's message and viewpoint. 169 The court held that the
city must protect its interests through means less intrusive to cable op-
erators' first amendment rights. 7°
The court also relied on the public forum doctrine to support its
decision. 7' The Ninth Circuit identified public utility poles as the rel-
evant forum. 17 2 The court found that the poles constituted a public
forum by designation because of the government's intent to open the
forum for communicative purposes.' 73 The state indicated this intent
by dedicating surplus space for cable companies' use and by the city's
auction process.' 74 The court found that the government's regulations
165. Id. The reasonableness of a government regulation on noncommunicative as-
pects of speech is judged under the O'Brien test. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968).
166. 754 F.2d at 1405-06 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
PCI conceded that the city had a legitimate interest in limiting the disruption of
public areas and that "this interest is 'unrelated to the suppression of free expression.'"
754 F.2d at 1406. PCI argued, however, that the city's method of minimizing disrup-
tion by granting an exclusive franchise was not legitimate because it created a risk that
city officials would discriminate on the basis of a cable operator's program contents. Id
167. Id.
168. Id. The court opined that the unique characteristics of cable television that
justify government regulation distinguish cable from the print media. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1406-07.
171. Id. at 1406.
172. Id. at 1407-09. See supra notes 70-141 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the public forum doctrine.
173. 754 F.2d at 1408. The Ninth Circuit found that utility poles do not constitute
traditional public fora even though they are located on the streets and alleys. Id. The
Court found that the property's location did not determine its appropriate characteriza-
tion. Rather, the court must look to the property's normal usage and the government's
actions with respect to the property. Id. at 1407-08.
174. Id. at 1409.
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violated the first amendment. 175
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in,
Vincent, which held that utility poles constituted a nonpublic forum.
176
The Court of Appeals noted that the posting of signs in Vincent was
not compatible with the normal use of the utility poles, and that the
city prohibited the posting of all signs. 177 In Preferred, however, there
was evidence of the city's intent to open the property for communica-
tive purposes, and use of the poles for carrying cable lines was compati-
ble with the property's normal use. 178
The court held that the restrictions on access rendered the franchise
process unconstitutional 179 because the regulations constituted a prior
restraint on speech. °80 The court noted that the franchise process cre-
ated an impermissible risk of viewpoint and content discrimination.I81
The court held unconstitutional the city's award of an exclusive
franchise where the property could accommodate more speakers.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision and re-
manded the case to the district court for further fact finding.1 82 The
Court noted that it affirmed the decision on narrow grounds. 18 3 The
Court found that PCI stated an injury upon which the district court
could grant relief.1 84 The Court found that the activities of a cable
operator implicate the first amendment.185 In his majority opinion,
Justice Rehnquist noted that not all protected speech is permissible
everywhere and at all times. 186 Here, where speech and conduct are
linked, the Court must test the constitutionality of the regulation by
balancing cable operators' first amendment rights against society's
175. Id. at 1409.
176. Id. at 1408-09. The court noted that it would hold the regulations unconstitu-
tional, even if it found that a utility pole did not constitute a public forum, because the
regulation was viewpoint discriminatory. Id. at 1409.
177. Id. at 1408-09. See supra notes 115-125 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Vincent.
178. 754 F.2d at 1408-09.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1409.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
184. Id. at 2036.
185. Id. at 2037.
186. Id.
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competing interests."8 7 The Court refused to conduct such balancing
absent further fact finding.18
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and O'Connor, wrote
a separate concurrence joining the Court's opinion.189 Justice Black-
mun emphasized that the Court's opinion left unanswered the proper
standard for judging first amendment challenges to a municipality's re-
striction of access to cable facilities.19
IV. ANALYSIS
If the Preferred case returns to the Supreme Court, the Court will
once again address the difficult issue of cable television's first amend-
ment status. 91 The parties may ask the Court to consider both the
appropriateness of employing the public forum doctrine to define
cable's first amendment status and the validity of the Ninth Circuit's
public forum analysis.
The Ninth Circuit appropriately determined that the relevant prop-
erty for public forum analysis was the utility poles192 owned or con-
trolled by the city. 193
The court correctly determined that utility poles constitute a limited
public forum.194 Los Angeles' operation and policies with regard to
the property illustrated the city's intent to create a public forum. 95
The state legislature acknowledged and tacitly approved the dedication
of excess space on utility poles for cable operators' use, and the city's
auction process itself opened the property to cable operators. 96 Fur-
thermore, use of utility poles to carry cable is consistent with the nor-
mal use of the property. 97
The Ninth Circuit justifiably held the regulations unconstitu-
187. Id. at 2038.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring).
191. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring).
192. See supra note 10 and accompanying text for recent cases in which the Court
has refused to resolve this issue.
193. See supra notes 130-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's
instructions for applying the public forum doctrine.
194. See supra notes 133, 146 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 137-139, 172-174 and accompanying text.
196. 754 F.2d at 1409.
197. Id
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
380 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 34:353
tional 98 Once the court classified the poles as a public forum, any
restrictions on the poles' use are subject to strict scrutiny.199 Los An-
geles failed to demonstrate that the regulations were narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest. 2" The city's franchise process cre-
ated an impermissible risk of content or viewpoint discrimination. 20 1
The court found that less intrusive means to regulate the conduct were
available.20 2
The public forum doctrine balances cable operator's rights, local
governments' interests, and the first amendment's purpose of allowing
for broad dissemination of information.2 3 The doctrine permits the
community to receive information that a particular cable operator may
abhor, and it prevents the government from censoring speech or chill-
ing a cable operator through procedural regulations. 2 4 Furthermore,
government may only control cable access in a nondiscriminatory man-
ner. 20 5 A city must grant cable operators access where excess space
exists on its utility poles. Finally, the doctrine provides that a city's
time, place, and manner restrictions are constitutional only when they
are content neutral.20 6
Use of the public forum doctrine for determining the validity of gov-
ernment regulations of cable is more useful than previous judicial at-
tempts to fit cable within the broadcast or print models.20 7 Cable
198. Id at 1408.
199. Id at 1411.
200. See supra notes 114-120 and accompanying text.
201. 754 F.2d at 1408.
202. Id at 1409.
203. Id at 1408.
204. See P. PARSONS, supra note 21, at 124-126.
205. See id. at 124-125.
206. See id at 124.
207. Id Several commentators, however, have questioned the usefulness of the
public forum doctrine. Parsons suggested that three elements must be present for the
public forum doctrine to apply. First, the government must control the forum; second,
the forum must have a nexus to free speech; and finally, the activity must comply with
the normal usage of the forum. Id Parsons writes that the doctrine's government con-
trol element does not sufficiently provide for the doctrine's application because cable
systems are not state-owned. Id at 126, 128. Parsons appears to misapply the public
forum doctrine. Courts determine the relevant forum by looking at the government
property to which a cable operator seeks access. In Preferred, this property would be
the city's utility poles. Different questions would anse where a cable operator sought
access to another operator's cable lines. But see Brunelli, Why Courts Should Not Use
Public Forum Doctrine Analysis in Considering Cable Operators' Claims Under the First
Amendment, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 541 (1986) (arguing the public forum analysis hides the
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television does not suffer from the physical limitations which justify the
government's regulation of the broadcast industry.20 Yet cable poses
significant problems for public safety and convenience which are not
present with the print media.' The public forum doctrine allows the
court to consider a city's interests while being attentive to cable's first
amendment implications.
A court must determine the degree of significance it should give to
the city's interest in protecting public safety and keeping public land
free from disruptions. A city can address these concerns, however, by
enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regulations that do not
unduly restrict access.210
Perhaps a more serious problem is determining what standards
should guide a city when the number of cable operators seeking access
to government property exceeds the available space.211 Most munici-
palities will grant access rights to cable operators who best conform to
the mainstream views of the city government and its citizens. Cable
operators with radical views and fringe programming will have a diffi-
cult time gaining access. Without guidelines preventing content dis-
crimination, consumers will fail to benefit from the Cable Act's
purpose of promoting diversity.212
Initially it was relatively simple for a court to determine those places
that fit within Justice Robert's definition of "public forum. 2 3 Now
that "public forum" comprises more than streets and parks, it is in-
creasingly difficult for a court to distinguish between a public and a
nonpublic forum. In Vincent, the Supreme Court determined that a
utility pole was a nonpublic forum, while in Preferred, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found the same item to be a public forum. 214 The Court must
decide if certain public property constitutes a public forum for some
speakers but not for others.
real issues and interests in cable regulation and urging municipalities to grant access to
one cable operator while permitting mandatory and leased access channel
requirements).
208. See id See also supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
210. 754 F.2d at 1409. See also supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 207.
212. 754 F.2d at 1406. For example, St. Louis has blacked out the Playboy cable
network in the St. Louis area, thus depriving cable viewers of diversity.
213. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
214. 754 F.2d at 1408-09.
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Regulation of cable television is primarily a responsibility of munici-
palities. The municipality holds virtually unrestricted discretion in
awarding cable franchises. Thus, there exists in the present system the
potential for first amendment abuses. It is readily conceivable that a
municipality may award franchises on the views and programming of a
cable operator. Judicial application of the public forum doctrine en-
sures that the public is provided with the greatest diversity possible.
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